Abstract: Used power batteries have strong negative externalities, contrary to the original intention of new energy vehicle design. To promote the effective recycling of used power batteries, the prospect theory is coupled with evolutionary game theory, and the interests of the government, enterprises (automobile production) and the public are thoroughly considered so that the enterprises can be jointly supervised by the government and the public and a tripartite game model can be developed. Analogue numerical simulations are conducted for different scenarios of initial willingness, penalty composition, risk attitude coefficient and loss aversion coefficient, and in relation to awareness, reward and punishment mechanisms and profitability confidence of used power batteries in reality, analysis is made. Our study shows increasing the initial supervisory willingness of the public or the government promotes the recycling of used power batteries by enterprises; when the recycling strategy of enterprises is losing money, active recycling by enterprises is enhanced by increasing the amount of compensation from enterprises to the public, and decreasing the risk attitude coefficients and loss aversion coefficients of enterprises; in the recycling process of used power batteries, joint supervision is superior to individual supervision.