Abstract: In e-closed-loop supply chain dominated by re-manufacturers and financially constrained by e-commerce platforms, considering the fairness preference of the e-commerce platforms, a Stackelberg game model is established based on the traditional fairness reference frame and the Nash bargaining fairness reference frame respectively. The influence mechanism of financial constraint and fairness preference on the recycling decisions and profits of all parties are analyzed. Then, transfer payment is introduced to optimize the recycling decisions of e-closed-loop supply chain. The research shows that the high loan interest rate is unfavorable to e-closed-loop supply chain operations. The fairness preference is only beneficial to e-commerce platforms, but not to re-manufacturers or e-closed-loop supply chain. Besides, compared with the traditional fairness reference frame, the Nash bargaining fairness reference frame can better alleviate the negative impact of financial constraint and fairness preference on recycling decisions. Finally, no matter whether the fairness preference of the e-commerce platforms exists or not, the introduction of transfer payment can coordinate e-closed-loop supply chain, and Pareto can improve profits of all parties in e-closed-loop supply chain.